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NOTES & COMMENTS
MINOR'S CONSENT TO MEDICAL CARE:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE IN OKLAHOMA
The traditional rule that minors lack capacity to conduct their
affairs has recently been reevaluated; an illustration of this reevaluation
can be found in the area of medical treatment for minors.: The pur-
pose of this comment is to examine the changes that have taken place
in Oklahoma concerning a minor's capacity to authorize medical care
for himself. To facilitate an examination of these changes, this com-
ment will provide a brief review of the common law, a discussion of
statutory changes in Oklahoma, an analysis of cases of constitutional
significance and suggestions for an approach to the problem which is
consistent with current constitutional requirements.
THE COMMON LAW
Minority, under the common law, generally persisted until the age
of twenty-one.2 Until that age was reached, a person lacked legal
1. See Baker, Court Ordered Non-Emergency Medical Care for Infants, 18 CLEV.-
MAR. L. REv. 296 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Baker]; Paul, Legal Rights of Minors
to Sex-Related Medical Care, 6 CoLum. HuMAN RiGHTS L. REv. 357 (1974-75) [herein-
after cited as Paul]; Pilpel, Minor's Rights to Medical Care, 36 ALB. L. Rav. 462 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Pilpel]; Wadlington, Minors and Health Care: The Age of Consent,
11 OscooDE HAL. L.J. 115 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Wadlington]; Comment, Minors
and Contraceptives: A Constitutional Issue, 3 EcoLOGY L.Q. 843 (1973); Note, Domes-
tic Relations: Minors and Abortion-The Requirement of Parental Consent, 29 OKLA.
L. REv. 145 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Minors and Abortion]; Note, The Minor's
Right to Abortion and The Requirement of Parental Consent, 60 VA. L. REv. 305 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Minor's Right to Abortion].
2. James, The Age of Majority, 4 AM. J. LEoAL HIST. 22 (1960). The selection
of age twenty-one as the indicator of adulthood was linked to the tenure system of Eng-
land. However, as James points out, lower ages for majority were also recognized.
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'19771 MINOR'S CONSENT TO MEDICAL CARE
capacity to consent to medical care,3 that authority being reserved to
the parents or guardians.4 The requirement of parental consent was
founded, in part, on the notion that the right of parents to control their
children is in the nature of a property right.5 This right entitled the
parents to the care, custody, services and earnings of their children."
The requirement was also justified by the belief that the requirement
of parental consent promoted family harmony, discipline and authority.7
Under the common law rule, a minor was subject to the possibil-
ity of increased injury or suffering in the event he needed medical care
and his parents could not be found to consent to the treatment. Minors
who were economically independent of their parents were also subject
to similar risks, even though they functioned as adults. Besides
hampering the minor's ability to obtain needed medical services in the
absence of his parents' consent, the traditional conception of the paren-
tal right also led to extreme judicial reluctance to order medical care
for a minor in opposition to a parent's express refusal to consent.8
3. See Paul, supra note 1, at 360; Minors and Abortion, supra note 1, at 145;
Minor's Right to Abortion, supra note 1, at 309.
4. See, e.g., Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Younts v. St.
Francis Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc., 205 Kan. 292, 469 P.2d 330 (1970); Zoski
v. Gaines, 271 Mich. 1, 260 N.W. 99 (1935); Rogers v. Sells, 178 Okla. 103, 61 P.2d
1018 (1936); Moss v. Rishworth, 222 S.W. 225 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920). The right
of the parent or guardian to decide if medical care should be given to a child was justi-
fied by two arguments. First, "[t]he law assumed that a minor was not wise or mature
enough to determine what his or her medical needs were." Paul, supra note 1, at 360.
Second, "the parent, and especially the father, was vested with supreme control over the
child." School Bd. Dist. v. Thompson, 24 Okla. 1, 4, 103 P. 578, 579 (1909). Com-
ment, Counseling the Counselors: Legal Implications of Counseling Minors Without
Parental Consent, 31 MD. L. REv. 332, 335-37 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Counseling
the Counselors].
A parent's authority to control his children has been characterized as a property
right. Paul, supra note 1, at 357; Minors and Abortion, supra note 1, at 145; Minors
Right to Abortion, supra note 1, at 309. However, along with this right came obligations,
which limit the parent's power.
Each party to the parent-child relationship is possessed of rights and duties
as a result of his position. ... It is said that the parent has the right to cus-
tody, care and control of his child, as well as the child's services and earnings.
The child is generally held to have a right to shelter, food, clothing, education,
support, guidance and protection.
Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550, 270 N.E.2d 389 (1971). -
5. See note 4 supra.
6. Counseling the Counselors, supra note 4, at 335-36.
7. Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550, 270 N.E.2d 389 (1971); Roe v. Doe,
29 N.Y.2d 188, 272 N.E.2d 567, 324 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1971); Counseling the Counselors,
supra note 4, at 335-37.
8. See People v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280 (1870); Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass.
550, 270 N.E.2d 389 (1971); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied,
371 U.S. 890 (1962); Roe v. Doe, 29 N.Y.2d 188, 272 N.E.2d 567, 324 N.Y.S.2d 71
(1971); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942).
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The potential for harsh results under the common law rule led to
the creation of exceptions which still are recognized. When a minor's
condition presents a medical emergency, medical care can be rendered
without the consent of the parents or guardian.9 The partial or com-
plete'0 emancipation" of a minor is another firmly established excep-
tion.12 Under a more recent exception, with a possible constitutional
foundation,13 a "mature minor" may authorize medical care for him-
self.'4 A "mature minor" is "one who is sufficiently intelligent and
mature to understand the nature and consequences of the medical
treatment being sought."' 5 In determining whether the minor is suffi-
ciently mature to validly consent to the proposed care, relevant factors
9. See, e.g., Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Jackovach v. Yo-
corn, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N.W. 444 (1931); Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & School of
Nursing, Inc., 205 Kan. 292, 469 P.2d 330 (1970); Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S.W.2d 474
(Ky. 1952); Wells v. McGehee, 39 So. 2d 196 (La. Ct. App. 1949); Luka v. Lowrie,
171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912); Sullivan v. Montgomery, 155 Misc. 448, 279
N.Y.S. 575 (N.Y. City Ct. 1935); Rogers v. Sells, 178 Okla. 103, 61 P.2d 1018 (1936).
For a discussion of what constitutes an emergency, see Paul, supra note 1, at 361; Pilpel,
supra note 1, at 464; Minors and Abortion, supra note 1, at 146; Note, Torts-Medical
Treatment of Minors, 8 WAKE FoaRr L. REV. 148, 150-51 (1971).
10. The partial-complete dichotomy distinguishes minors that are emancipated only
for certain purposes, e.g., consenting to medical care, from minors that are emancipated
for all purposes. Paul, supra note 1, at 362. See Bach v. Long Island Jewish Hosp.,
49 Misc. 2d 207, 267 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
11. "'Emancipation' of a child is the relinquishment by the parent of control and
authority over the child, conferring on him the right to his earnings and terminating the
parent's legal duty to support the child." Swenson v. Swenson, 241 Mo. App. 21, -,
227,S.W.2d 103, 105 (1950). See Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 139 S.E.2d 753
(1965).
12. Emancipation can be effectuated by, inter alia: marriage, Crook v. Crook, 80
Ariz. 275, 296 P.2d 951 (1956); Bach v. Long Island Jewish Hosp., 49 Misc. 2d 207,
267 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Daubert v. Mosley, 487 P.2d 353 (Okla. 1971);
Smith v. Seibly, 72 Wash. 2d 16, 431 P.2d 719 (1967); military service, Swenson v.
Swenson, 241 Mo. App. 21, 227 S.W.2d 103 (1950); economic independence, Smith v.
Seibly, 72 Wash. 2d 16, 431 P.2d 719 (1967); parental consent, Crosby v. Crosby, 230
App. Div. 651, 246 N.Y.S. 384 (Sup. Ct. 1930); and "by conduct of the parent incon-
sistent with the performance of his parental obligations or by the assumption by the in-
fant of a status inconsistent with subjection to control by his parent." Murphy v. Mur-
phy, 206 Misc. 228, -, 133 N.Y.S.2d 796, 797 (Sup. Ct. 1954). See Roe v. Doe, 29
N.Y.2d 188, 272 N.E.2d 567, 324 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1971).
In Oklahoma, marriage, inter alia, is a statutory ground for emancipation. OKLA.
STAT. tit. 10, § 10 (1971). Also OK.LA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 91-93 (Supp. 1976) authorizes
courts to confer majority rights on minors in relation to contracts and the conduct of
business. See Hardesty v. Gordon, 189 Okla. 677, 119 P.2d 70 (1941) (discussing pred-
ecessor to current codification).
13. See notes 73-79 infra and accompanying text.
14. Paul, supra note 1, at 362.
15. Id. See Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. and School of Nursing, Inc., 205 Kan. 292,
469 P.2d 330 (1970); Bishop v. Shurly, 237 Mich. 76, 211 N.W. 75 (1926); Bakker
v. Welsh, 144 Mich. 632, 108 N.W. 94 (1906); Gulf & Ship Island R., Co. v. Sullivan,
155 Miss. 1, 119 So. 501 (1928); Smith v. Seibly, 72 Wash. 2d 16, 431 P.2d 719 (1967).
See also Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Zoski v. Gaines, 271 Mich,
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to be considered include the "age, intelligence, maturity, training, ex-
perience, economic independence, . . . general conduct as an adult
and freedom from the control of parents,' 1 6 the risk involved in the
particular procedure,' 7 and "whether the proposed [treatment] . . .
is for the benefit of the child and is done with a purpose of saving his
life or limb."' 8 While there is authority for the proposition that courts,
absent statutory authority, lack the power to order medical treatment
for minors even though the parents refuse to consent,' 9 the modem trend
and better reasoned approach is that courts can, under the parens
patriae doctrine,20 intervene within the family unit in order to protect
the child's interests. 21
1, 260 N.W. 99 (1935); Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956).
While the situation of the "mature minor" has not been presented to the Oklahoma
courts, in In re Hickory's Guardianship, 75 Okla. 79, 182 P. 233 (1919), it was stated:
"Theoretically speaking, a minor has no capacity at all to judge what is best for him
or his estate; but, properly speaking, when the minor is of an age approaching majority
. . . she may suggest facts and views of policy worthy of consideration by the court
.... ." Id. at 83, 182 P. at 236. Furthermore, Oklahoma, by statute, allows a minor
capable of giving an effective consent to authorize medical care without parental consent
in certain limited situations. See notes 38-41, 83-85 infra and accompanying text.
16. 72 Wash. 2d at -, 431 P.2d at 723.
17. Paul, supra note 1, at 362; Wadlington, supra note 1, at 119; Minor's Right to
Abortion, supra note 1, at 310.
18. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1941). See Younts v. St. Fran-
cis Hosp. and School of Nursing, Inc., 205 Kan. 292, -, 469 P.2d 330, 337-38 (1970);
Wadlington, supra note 1, at 119.
The "mature minor" exception has been characterized as an extension of the rule
"requiring that physicians obtain 'informed consent' from all patients before undertaking
treatment." Paul, supra note 1, at 362. See Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. and School
of Nursing, Inc., 205 Kan. 292, 469 P.2d 330 (1970).
An additional reason is often advanced in support of a parent's broad authority over
his or her children: The law presumes that it is in the best interest of the child "to
be under the nurture and care of its natural protector." Heinemann's Appeal, 96 Pa.
112, 114 (1880). See In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, -, 126 P.2d 765, 775-76 (1942).
19. See People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903); In re Vasko, 238
App. Div. 128, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (Sup. Ct. 1933); In re Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 25
N.Y.S.2d 624 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941); Baker, supra note 1, at 296.
20. "The power of the State, known as parens patriae, springs from its power to pro-
tect those subjects who cannot protect themselves, and from its interests in the proper
upbringing of future citizens." Counseling the Counselors, supra note 4, at 338 (foot-
note omitted). See People v. Labrenz, 411 111. 618, -, 104 N.E.2d 769, 773, cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, -, 181 A.2d 751, 758,
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, -, 126 P.2d 765,
777 (1942).
21. See, e.g., People v. Labrenz, 411 IlM. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S.
824 (1952); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969) (dictum); Raleigh Fitkin-
Paul Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 NJ. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985
(1964); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962);
Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 128 N.J. Super. 498, 320 A.2d 518 (1974); In re Clark,
21 Ohio App. 2d 86, 185 N.E.2d 128 (Ct. C.P. 1962); Heinemann's Appeal, 96 Pa.
112 (1880); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942); Counseling the
Counselors, supra note 4, at 338.
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Despite the recognition of exceptions, the common law proved in-
adequate in insuring that a minor had access to necessary medical care.
Exceptions to the rule of parental consent failed to serve the minor's
interest because their principle purpose was to provide physicians with
a defense against liability should a minor be treated without obtaining
the consent of the parent.22 Judicial reversal of a parent's decision
usually requires that the life of the minor be endangered without medi-
cal attention. In response to these problems, state legislatures have
begun to increase the number of instances where minors can obtain
medical care without parental consent. Furthermore, statutory author-
ization to order treatment in certain instances has been given to the
courts.24 Oklahoma has followed this trend.
STATUTORY APPROACH IN OKLAHOMA
To a large extent, statutory treatment of minors and their medical
care in Oklahoma can be characterized as a reaffirmation of common
law principles. For example, the general presumption that a minor is
without capacity to consent is preserved. 5 Moreover, in recognition
of the right to control their offspring, parents are entitled to the care,
custody, services and earnings of their minor unemancipated children.20
Finally, two common law exceptions to parental consent, emergency
and emancipation, are retained."
Oklahoma has departed from the common law in some respects.
In keeping with the national trend, the Oklahoma legislature has re-
22. Minor's Right to Abortion, supra note 1, at 310.
23. Id. at 311.
24. See Pilpel, supra note 1.
25. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 12 (1971). See also Minors and Abortion, supra note
1, at 153.
26. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 5 (Supp. 1976). It can be argued, however, that a change
in perception of the parent's rights has occurred. While the Supreme Court, in School
Bd. Dist. v. Thompson, 24 Okla. 1, 103 P. 578 (1909), declared that parents at common
law had "supreme control" over their children, a slightly different position was taken
in Carignan v. State, 469 P.2d 656 (Okla. 1970). There the court stated:
The state, through its legislature, has wide power with respect to the rights
of the parents over their children, which affect the welfare of the children. A
parent's right to a child is not a property right in the general sense, but more
in the nature of a trust which is subject to control and regulation by the state.
The parental rights to the child must yield when the welfare of the child de-
mands.
Id. at 659 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
27. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 518 (1971); OxLA STAT. tit. 63, § 2602(7) (Supp.
1976); OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, § 5 (Supp. 1976). Parents may also authorize other adults,
to whom care of the minor has been entrusted, to consent to medical care for their child.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 170.1 (Supp. 1976).
516 [Vol. 12:512
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duced the age of majority for males for most purposes, including con-
sent to medical care, from the common law age of twenty-one to
eighteen.28 In addition, the legislature has made it a misdemeanor for
a parent to willfully fail to provide necessary medical care for his
child.2 9 However, the statute offers little protection since, in addition
to the requirement of intent,30 it provides a defense for the parent who
"in good faith, selects and depends upon spiritual means alone through
prayer, in accordance with the tenets and practice of a recognized
church or religious denomination, for the treatment or cure of disease
or remedial care of . . . [his] child.131  The effect of the statute is
to limit the discretion of the parent, in certain instances, to a standard
of reasonableness. Thus the parent must furnish that amount of
medical care that "an ordinarily prudent person, solicitous for the wel-
fare of his child and anxious to promote its recovery, would provide."' 2
The statute does not, however, affirmatively provide the minor
with a means to secure medical care independent of the parent's
wishes. While the requirement of intent and the religious defense are,
no doubt, factors contributing to its ineffectiveness, the statute's main
defect is that it is not designed to afford the minor any rights to medical
care. Rather it punishes "the guilty parent only after the harm, which
. . . [is] often irreparable . . . has befallen the unfortunate child. '33
Perhaps in recognition of its inadequacy, the statute contains the pro-
viso that "nothing contained herein shall prevent a court from imme-
diately assuming custody of a child and ordering whatever action may
be necessary, including medical treatment, to protect his health or wel-
fare." 4
28. OsIA. STAT. tit. 15 § 13 (Supp. 1976); OKLA. STAr. tit. 63, § 2601(a) (Supp.
1976). Previously, the age of majority was eighteen years for females and twenty-one
years for males. Bassett v. Bassett, 521 P.2d 434 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974).
29. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 852 (Supp. 1976). Additionally, it is a felony if the par-
ent "leaves the state with intent to avoid providing" his child with necessary medical
care. Id.
30. See Lamb v. State, 293 P.2d 624 (Okla. Crim. App. 1956).
31. OKLA. STAr. tit. 21, § 852 (Supp. 1976). Before this provision was amended,
it was held that the defendant's religious belief was not a defense to the statutory of-
fense. Owens v. State, 6 Okla. Crim. 110, 116 P 345 (1911).
32. 6 Okla. Crim. at 113, 116 P. at 346.
33. Baker, supra note 1, at 298.
34. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 852 (Supp. 1976). A Washington statute authorizing state
courts to order medical care for minors has been held valid over the religious claims
of parents that judicial action under the statute ordering blood transfusions for their
children was a violation of their constitutional rights. Jehovah's Witnesses v. King




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 12 [2013], Iss. 3, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol12/iss3/4
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
By civil legislation, the courts of Oklahoma are authorized by stat-
ute to order medical treatment for a minor upon the filing of a depend-
ency petition.35 Yet, while a dependent child includes a minor "who
is in need of special care and treatment because of his physical or men-
tal condition, and his parents .. . [are] unable to provide it,"3 0 parental
rights cannot be terminated if the lack of care is required by the
parents' religious beliefs.8 7 As under the criminal provision, the state
may not interfere until the minor suffers some degree of harm as a re-
sult of the lack of treatment.
Recent legislation grants minors the capacity to consent to medical
treatment, regardless of the parents' wishes, in instances going beyond
the common law exceptions of emergency care and emancipation."8
Under the new legislation, a minor may consent to the "prevention,
diagnosis and treatment" of past or present pregnancies, communicable
diseases and abuse of drugs, including alcohol. 0 In addition, care may
be given to a minor who is physically or mentally incapable of consent-
ing and has no known relatives or guardian, if two physicians agree on
the proposed care.40  A two-physician rule is also imposed in nonemer-
gency cases when the needed care involves "major surgery, general
anesthesia, or a life-threatening procedure," irrespective of the minor's
physical and mental capacity to consent.41 One significant limitation
of the statute is the express exclusion of abortions and sterilizations
from the permissible health services which can be rendered to the con-
senting minor.42
Two reasons can be offered in support of the limitations on the
scope of the Oklahoma statute.43  First, the legislature may have be-
35. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1103 (Supp. 1976); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1120(b)
(1971).
36. OKLA. SrAT. tit. 10, § 1101(d) (Supp. 1976).
37. OKLA. SrAT. tit. 10, § 1130(B) (Supp. 1976). In common with the criminal
statute previously discussed, see note 34 supra and accompanying text, this statute pro-
vides that "nothing contained herein shall prevent a court from immediately assuming
custody of a child and ordering whatever action may be necessary, including medical
treatment, to protect his health or welfare."
38. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 2601-2606 (Supp. 1976).
39. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2602(3) (Supp. 1976). OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-532.1
(1971). provides: "Any person, regardless of age, has the capacity to consent to exami-
nation and treatment by a licensed physician for any venereal disease."
40. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2602(6) (Supp. 1976).
41. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2604 (Supp. 1976).
42. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2601(c) (Supp. 1976).
43. Since OKLA. STAT. tit 63, § 2602(6) requires the agreement of two physicians
before treatment can be rendered to a minor who is physically or mentally incompetent
to consent, see note 40 supra and accompanying text, implicit in the statute is the under-
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lieved that minors are not sufficiently mature to allow them to consent
to medical care which carries life or death consequences." Second,
in areas not covered by the statute, it may have been determined that
parental control should be maintained except in certain cases, such as
those involving drug abuse and communicable diseases, where the
health and welfare of the public demands that access to medical care
be readily available to minors who may be reluctant to disclose their
afflictions to their parents.45
Despite the modifications to the common law that have occurred
in Oklahoma, the minor still lacks the ability, in most instances, to ob-
tain medical care independent of his parents' wishes. Whether the
state can validly restrict minors' access to medical care is considered
in the next section.
A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
The Development of Constitutional Rights for Minors
Express recognition of certain constitutional rights in minors is a
relatively recent development. One of the first cases to deal with the
issue was West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette." The
Supreme Court invalidated a resolution of the state board of education
which required participation by pupils and teachers in flag salute and
pledge of allegience ceremonies conducted on a regular basis in West
Virginia public schools. In the course of its opinion, the Court de-
clared: "That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason
for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if
we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to
discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes. '47
The principle of Barnette was reaffirmed in Tinker v. Des Moines In-
dependent Community School District.48  In limiting the power of
school officials to restrict the use of symbols by students to express their
opposition to the government's policy in Vietnam, the Court declared:
"School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students.
Students in school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our Con-
stitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State
44. See Minor's Right to Abortion, supra note 1, at 309.
45. See Paul, supra note 1, at 373; Comment, Abortion: An Unresolved Issue-
Are Parental Consent Statutes Unconstitutional?, 55 NEB. L. REv. 256, 269 (1976).
46. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
47. Id. at 637.
48. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
1977]
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must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to
the State."4 9 In addition to substantive rights, minors have also been
afforded procedural protections. 0
Barnette, Tinker and other cases5' establish constitutional protec-
tion for minors against state interference in areas involving fundamental
rights. However, the protection afforded minors is not coextensive
with that enjoyed by adults.5 2 One reason that the state is allowed
more authority over children is society's interest in making sure "that
children be b6th safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for
growth into free and independent well-developed men and citizens.""8
Implicit in the state's broader authority is the justification, relied on at
common law, that minors lack sufficient wisdom and capacity to func-
tion without the aid of third parties.5 4
The primary obligation, however, for the protection of society's
children lies with the parents or guardians and not the state. In cases
involving conflicts between parental rights and state action restricting
those rights, it has been recognized that "the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and free-
dom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder."55  Thus, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,5" the right of Amish parents
to raise and educate their children in accordance with their religious
beliefs justified the exemption of the children from the state's compul-
sory school attendance law.57 In addition to restricting the state's au-
49. Id. at 511.
50. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967);
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). Cf. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528 (1971) (jury not required in adjudicatory aspect of juvenile hearing).
51. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); School Dist. of Abington v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), noted
in Comment, Minors and Contraceptives: A Constitutional Issue, 3 EcoLoOY L.Q. 843,
853-54 (1973).
52. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 169 (1944).
53. 321 U.S. at 165.
54. See note 4 supra. However, the common law presumption that minors lack the
necessary attributes of competency until the age of twenty-one has been rejected by the
Supreme Court. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831, 2843 (1976).
55. 321 U.S. at 166. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F.
Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 598 (1968).
56. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
57. See also West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1942) (invalidat-
ing provision requiring flag salute and pledge of allegiance by school students as con-
trary to parents' religious belief); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (in-
validating state law generally requiring attendance at public schools); Meyer v. Nebraska
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thority over minors, the doctrine of parental rights has restricted the
exercise of constitutional rights by the children themselves.5"
As in the situation involving the power of the state over a minor,
the ability of the parent or guardian to control the minor is subject to
limitation. In Prince v. Massachusetts,59 the Supreme Court upheld
the validity of a state statute prohibiting parents or guardians from al-
lowing or compelling their minor children to sell, inter alia, magazines
on the public streets. The statute was upheld over the guardian's claim
that it violated the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of
religion. In response to this claim, the Court observed:
The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty
to expose the community or the child to communicable
disease or the latter to ill health or death.
• . . Parents may be free to become martyrs them-
selves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical cir-
cumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they
have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they
can make that choice for themselves.
60
Similar reasoning led to a decision upholding the validity of a state stat-
ute which allowed the state courts of Washington to order blood trans-
fusions for minors in certain instances, over the religious objections of
the parents.6
It is within the limitations on state and parental power that the
minor's constitutional rights exist. The scope of those rights has not
been well defined; few cases have presented the problem. Usually,
the rights of minors have arisen in cases involving conflicts between
the power of the state and the power of the parents. As a result, the
task of the Court has been primarily to define the relationship between
the state and parents; any definition of the rights of minors is inciden-
tal to the process. 62 In instances where the rights of minors were di-
rectly before the Court, the conflict has involved the limitations of state
262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating statute forbidding the teaching of German in the state
public schools).
58. See notes 38-42 supra and accompanying text.
59. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
60. Id. at 166-67, 170.
61. Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash.
1967), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 598 (1968). Thus, the Oklahoma statutes allowing
courts to order medical treatment for minors, see notes 33-37 supra and accompanying
text, would not appear to be subject to constitutional attack on the same or similar
grounds.
62. See Minor's Right to Abortion, supra note 1, at 321.
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power over the minor's constitutional rights.63  Until recently, there-
fore, the relationship between the parental right of control and the
minor's exercise of constitutional rights had not been considered."'
However, in 1976, the Court was directly faced with the question in
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,65 a decision which established the
minor's right of privacy.
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth: Right of Privacy and Mature Minors
In Danforth, a Missouri statutory scheme required, prior to the
performance of an abortion, the patient's execution of a form affirming
"that her consent is informed and freely given and is not the result of
coercion, '66 written consent of the woman's husband to the abortion
and written consent of a parent if the patient was under eighteen years
of age. The issue before the Court was whether any of these require-
ments violated the woman's right of privacy, as established by Roe v.
Wade,67 by impermissibly interfering with her decision to terminate her
pregnancy. The Court held that the requirement of the woman's consent
was valid. In upholding this aspect of the statute, it relied on the
notion that:
The decision to abort. . . is an important, and often a stress-
ful one, and it is desirable and imperative that it be made
with full knowledge of its nature and consequences. The
woman is the one primarily concerned, and her awareness of
the decision and its significance may be assured, constitution-
ally, by the State to the extent of requiring her prior written
consent.68
The spousal and parental consent provisions of the statute, however,
were invalidated by the Court. With respect to spousal consent, the
Court recognized the interest of the husband, but nevertheless held that
"since the State cannot regulate or proscribe abortion during the first
stage [of pregnancy, under Roe], when the physician and his patient
make that decision, the State cannot delegate authority to any particular
63. See notes 46-54 supra and accompanying text.
64. "Mhe Court did not need to consider the child's rights in contrast to those
of the parents, since in each case there was an apparent unity of interest." Minors
Right to Abortion, supra note 1, at 321. While there also was no need to consider the
problem in Prince, since the controversy involved a state-parent conflict, the Court rec-
ognized that the interest of the child may not always be compatible with that of the
parents. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
65. 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
66. Id. at 2839.
67. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
68. 96 S. Ct. at 2840.
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person, even the spouse, to prevent abortion during that same
period."69 As in the case of spousal consent, the Court found that the
parental consent provision was an unconstitutional delegation of a veto
power to third persons over the minor's decision to abort.70
The impact of Danforth on the minor's ability to consent to medi-
cal care is significant. First, the minor's right of privacy is given ex-
press recognition in a case which attempted to restrict the minor's ac-
cess to medical care. Also significant is the Court's treatment of the
interests asserted in support of the statute's validity. Two justifica-
tions, discipline and maintaining and promoting family unity, were of-
fered for restricting minors' rights. While the Court ultimately con-
cluded that the state's interest in promoting family unity and discipline
did not outweigh the privacy interest involved, it first questioned
whether the two interests were served at all by the statute. The Court
stated:
It is difficult. . . to conclude that providing a parent with
absolute power to overrule a determination, made by the
physician and his minor patient, to terminate the patient's
pregnancy will serve to strengthen the family unit. Neither
is it likely that such veto power will enhance parental author-
ity or control where the minor and the nonconsenting parent
are so fundamentally in conflict and the very existence of the
pregnancy already has fractured the family structure. 71
Thus, two of the traditional interests generally asserted in support of
the requirement of parental consent to medical care of a minor2
received only summary treatment by the Court in evaluating the statute
before it. This treatment suggests insignificance of these interests in
light of the privacy interest involved.
Finally, the Court emphasized that the Danforth decision did not
mean that every minor, "regardless of age or maturity, may give effec-
tive consent for termination of her pregnancy. ' 73  Implicit in the
passage is a recognition that only mature minors may exercise constit-
tutional rights; that is, minors "who [are] sufficiently intelligent and
mature to understand the nature and consequences of the medical
treatment being sought. '74  Thus, it appears unconstitutional to limit
69. Id. at 2841.
70. Id. at 2843.
71. Id. at 2844.
72. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
73. 96 S. CL at 2844.
74. Paul, supra note 1, at 362. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 242 (1972)
("Where the child is mature enough to express potentially conflicting desires, it would
1977]
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 12 [2013], Iss. 3, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol12/iss3/4
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
the mature minor's exercise of constitutional rights in a manner which
differs from limitations imposed on adults.75
Further support for these conclusions is supplied by Bellotti v.
Baird,76 decided the same day as Danforth. In Baird, the Court was
confronted with an abortion statute which required the consent of both
parents of a pregnant woman less than eighteen years of age. The stat-
ute differed from the one in Danforth in that parental refusal could
be overruled by a judicial order on a showing of sufficient cause. The
Court held the lower federal court in error for not abstaining, thereby
giving the state supreme court the opportunity to interpret the new stat-
ute in a manner which could avoid constitutional infirmity. In finding
the statute susceptible to a construction "which might avoid in whole
or in part the necessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or at least
materially change the nature of the problem,"77 thus making abstention
appropriate, the Court found the interpretation of the statute offered
by state officials charged with enforcement of its provisions an impor-
tant consideration.
The picture thus painted by the.., appellants is of a statute
that prefers parental consultation and consent, but that per-
mits a mature minor capable of giving informed consent to
obtain, without undue burden, an order permitting the abor-
tion without parental consultation. . . . The statute, as thus
read, would be fundamentally different from a statute that
creates a "parental veto."
. . . [W]e are concerned with a statute directed toward
minors, as to whom there are unquestionably greater risks
of inability to give an informed consent."
In light of the above position, coupled with he validation in Danforth
of the statutory provision requiring execution of a consent form by the
pregnant adult, it appears that the state may impose restrictions on the
minor's consent to medical treatment as long as the restrictions do not
unduly burden the individual's right of privacy 70 and insure that the
minor possesses sufficient mental capacity and awareness to give an in-
be an invasion of the child's rights to permit .. an imposition [of the parents' wishes
and religious beliefs] without canvassing his views") (Douglas, J., dissenting).
75. Like other constitutional protections, the right of privacy is not absolute; the
exercise of individual fundamental rights, notwithstanding the age of the person in-
volved, is limited by the existence of compelling state interests. See Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973).
76. 96 S. Ct. 2857 (1976).
77. Id. at 2866.
78. Id. at 2865-66.
79. Id. at 2866.
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formed consent. An impermissible intrusion by third parties results
when parents are given the power to completely negate their mature
minor's reasoned choice.
From Danforth and Bellotti the following principle can be drawn:
When fundamental rights are recognized for adults, these same rights
must not be denied the "mature minor." Since adults have the right,
under the doctrine of informed consent, 0 to control the medical care
they receive, the "mature minor" must be afforded the same right.
This conclusion is further supported by the holding in Danforth. While
Danforth involved only the minor's right under the privacy rationale to
secure an abortion and not the right to obtain medical care in general,
this difference should not affect the applicability of the principles in-
volved. As in the abortion situation, the decision to seek medical care
in general is a matter affecting the bodily integrity and health of the
individual. Therefore, the decision is no less a matter involving a per-
sonal right, "'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty,' "81 than is the decision to abort; as a result, it is a matter pro-
tected by the right of privacy from undue interference by third
parties. -8 2
Validity of the Oklahoma Statute Regarding a Minor's
Right to Consent to Medical Care
As previously noted, 8 Oklahoma has granted the minor the right
to obtain medical care and services without parental consent which ex-
tends beyond the rights available to the minor at common law. How-
ever, the scope of the statute is narrow, since the right to consent is
limited to situations involving care for pregnancy, drug abuse and com-
municable diseases84 and expressly excludes abortions and steriliza-
80. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Nishi v. Hart-
well, 52 Hawaii 188, 473 P.2d 116 (1970); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d
1093, rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295
A.2d 676 (R.I. 1972); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967); ZeBarth v. Swedish
Hosp., 81 Wash. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 596, 207
N.W.2d 297 (1973). The doctrine of informed consent protects the same interests as
the right of privacy since it insures to "[e]very human being of adult years and sound
mind ... [the] right to determine what shall be done with his own body .... "
Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914). See
464 F.2d at 780.
81. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
82. Id. at 152-53.
83. See notes 38-45 supra and accompanying text.
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tions. 85 In areas outside the scope of the statute, the rule of parental
consent applies.88 An issue arises as to whether the state impermis-
sibly infringes upon the minor's right of privacy by requiring parental
consent in all cases except those exempted by the statute.87
Under the Danforth rationale,8 the Oklahoma statute is unconsti-
tutional. Its defect is the same as that of the parental consent provision
of the Missouri statute in Danforth; it permits parental veto over
minors' decisions in an area of intimate personal concern. 9 Since Dan-
forth found the interests of family unity and discipline insufficient to
allow intrusion into the minor's zone of privacy in this manner,00 the
only interest left to consider is that of insuring an informed and intelli-
gent consent. This interest is not served by the statute, since it cannot
be assumed that minors are sufficiently mature to give an effective con-
sent to matters within the statute but not mature enough to consent
to medical procedures outside the scope of the statute.0 1 Furthermore,
a parental veto provision is not a permissible way of insuring the intelli-
gence and competency of the minor's consent.92
To increase the chances of the Oklahoma statute withstanding a
constitutional attack, the exemptions from parental veto of a minor's
consent must be broadened to include all areas of medical care. Re-
strictions can be maintained in order to limit the right of self-determina-
tion to "mature minors" and procedures may be imposed for the pur-
pose of ascertaining if the particular minor can give an informed and
intelligent consent to the proposed medical care. However, the limita-
tions created to serve these purposes must not unduly interfere with the
minor's privacy right. "Where. .. 'fundamental rights' are involved
. . . legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the
legitimate state interests at stake." 93
85. OxLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2601(c) (Supp. 1976). See note 42 supra and accom-
panying text.
86. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
87. While other situations where consent of the minor is specified by statute exist,
the constitutional problems are best illustrated by the situations presented.
88. See notes 66-75 supra and accompanying text.
89. The statute specifically provides that "[the minor's] self-consent only applies
to . . . those conditions specified [in the statute]." OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2602(3)
(Supp. 1976).
90. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
91. Implicit in the statute is the limitation that only minors who are sufficiently ma-
ture can give an operative consent to the care and procedures specified therein. See note
43 supra.
92. See 96 S. Ct. at 2864-65.
93. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (citations omitted). One suggested
solution is to allow the attending physician to determine whether the particular minor
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CONCLUSION
"Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority." 94
Underlying this statement is the notion that some minors should not
be treated differently than adults. In the area of medical care, the
right of privacy demands that the minor who possesses the intelligence
and capacity to consent must be freed from the extreme intrusion
created by the requirement of parental consent. While the state may
create procedures designed to insure that the minor is competent to
consent, it cannot give third parties, such as parents, the absolute
power to negate the implementation of an informed decision by the
"mature minor." The days when parents were given "the power of
life and death . . . over their children '95 have ended. Their power
to adversely affect their children's health should also be denied.
Abolishing parental consent as a condition precedent to the medical
treatment of "mature minors" is a step in that direction.
William F. Smith
can give an effective and informed consent to the necessary care. See Comment, Abor-
tion: An Unresolved Issue-Are Parental Consent Statutes Unconstitutional?, 55 NEB.
L. REv. 256, 277-79 (1969). As noted earlier, the Oklahoma statute under considera-
tion requires at least two physicians to agree on the proposed course of care when the
minor is incapable of expressing consent. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
It would be relatively easy to alter this provision to provide that the physicians be re-
quired to determine only whether the minor is competent, physically and mentally, to
consent. Such a change in the role of physicians under the statute would be more com-
patible with their traditional role of advising "the patient of the state of his closest
physical, mental and social associate-his own body." Delgado, Euthanasia Recon-
sidered-The Choice of Death as an Aspect of the Right of Privacy, 17 Aniz. L. REv.
474, 478 (1975). Furthermore, giving the physician a consulting function avoids the
charge that the statute grants the physician a veto power over a "mature minor's" decis-
ion, since care may be rendered to the minor without his consent if he is considered
incapable of making an informed decision. See 96 S. Ct. at 2865-66.
94. 96 S. Ct at 2843.
95 People v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280, 285 (1870).
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